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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Musik gilt als Informationsgut, welches sich digitalisieren und somit über Internetplattformen
leicht vervielfältigen lässt. Für die Produzenten und Rechteinhaber solcher Güter ergeben sich
daraus Chancen, aber auch Risiken. Digitale Piraterie führt zu enormen Umsatzeinbußen der
Musikindustrie, welche diese nach neuen Einkommensquellen im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung
suchen lässt.
Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich der theoretischen Analyse eines Geschäftsmodells, das po-
tenziellen Kunden die von ihnen nachgefragte Musik als sogenannten Stream anbietet. Aus-
gangspunkt dieses Modells ist das Konzept, dass der Konsum von Musik auch ohne physischen
Besitz ermöglicht werden soll. Die Musik ist hierbei auf einem Server abgelegt und kann von den
Konsumenten auf Nachfrage gehört werden. Ein solches Geschäftsmodell lässt sich prinzipiell
über zwei Wege finanzieren. Einerseits können angemeldete Kunden Musik legal und umsonst
hören. Eine Finanzierung erfolgt (analog zum Free-TV) über Werbeunterbrechungen zwischen
den einzelnen Musikstücken. Andererseits werden Kunden ’Flatrate-Verträge’ angeboten, welche
nach Zahlung eines monatlichen Pauschalbetrages uneingeschränkten und werbefreien Zugang
zum musikalischen Angebot gewähren.
Im Rahmen eines solchen Geschäftsmodells und unter der Annahme eines Monopolmarktes
führt die Untersuchung zu folgenden Ergebnissen: Werbefinanzierung generiert hohe Erträge,
sofern die Kunden sich durch die Werbung eher gering beeinträchtigt fühlen. In diesem Fall ist
es für den Anbieter optimal, einen hohen Preis für einen ’Flatrate-Vertrag’ zu wählen, um die
Nachfrage für das werbefinanzierte Angebot künstlich zu stimulieren und somit höhere, durch
Werbung geschaffene Renten zu Lasten der Kunden abzuschöpfen. Haben Konsumenten zusätz-
lich die Alternative, Musik illegal über ’Peer-to-Peer-Plattformen’ zu teilen, ist zu beobachten,
dass das Maß der Strafverfolgung für illegale Downloads wie ein Rentenverteilungsmehanismus
zwischen dem monopolistischen Anbieter und den Musikkonsumenten wirkt. Die Gesetzeslage
verhält sich hierbei zur aggregierten Konsumentenwohlfahrt im Sinne von "je strikter, desto
niedriger". Allerdings senkt eine intensivere Strafverfolgung nicht zwangsläufig die Wohlfahrt.
Ganz im Gegenteil, ab einer bestimmten Intensität der Strafandrohung erhöht sich die Wohl-
fahrt, da stark ansteigende Gleichgewichtsprofite des monopolistischen Anbieters den Effekt der
abnehmenden Konsumentenwohlfahrt ausgleichen, beziehungsweise überkompensieren.
Nontechnical Summary
Music can be characterized as an information good and is therefore amenable to digitalization
and copying through online sharing networks. Chances and risks arise from digitalization for
the producers and right owners of these goods. Digital piracy is accountable for massive losses
in revenues of the music industry which is induced to search for new sources of income in the
era of digitalization.
This work intends to provide a theoretical analysis of a business model which offers the requested
music as a so called stream to potential customers. The origin of such model is a conception which
allows for consumption of music without physical possession of the music file. Therefore music
will be stored on a server and can be listened on demand by consumers. Such a business model
is generally funded through two sources. On the one hand, customers who made a subscription
are allowed for legal free of charge listening. Funds are generated through commercial breaks
between the particular songs (analogous to free TV). On the other hand, ’flat-rate contracts’
are offered to customers allowing for unlimited and ad-free access to the musical content after
the payment of a monthly blanket fee.
Within the framework of such a business model and under consideration of a monopolistic
market structure, the investigation yields the following results. Advertising funding may generate
high revenues provided that customers feel lowly disturbed by commercial breaks. In this case, it
will be optimal for the provider to chose a high ’flat-rate price’ in order to factitiously excite free
of charge demand and therefore to capture higher, advertising created rents at customers’ costs.
If consumers are given the alternative to illegally share music through ’peer-to-peer file sharing
networks’, one can investigate that prosecution for illegal file-sharing appears as a rent allocation
mechanism between the monopolist and music consumers. At this juncture, an increasing law
enforcement causes a decreasing consumer surplus. However, an intensified legal prosecution
does not necessarily lower welfare. On the contrary, from a certain level of legal prosecution,
sharply increasing equilibrium profits of the monopolist offset and overcompensate decreasing
consumer surplus and let welfare increase.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the upcoming business model of online streaming services allowing
music consumers either to subscribe to a service which provides free-of-charge access to
streaming music and which is funded by advertising, or to pay a monthly flat fee in order
to get ad-free access to the content of the service accompanied with additional benefits.
Both businesses will be launched by a single provider of streaming music. By imposing a
two-sided market model on the one hand combined with a direct transaction between the
streaming service and its flat-rate subscribers on the other hand, the investigation shows
that it can be highly profitable to launch a business which is free-of-charge for subscribers if
advertising imposes a weak nuisance to music consumers. If this is the case, and by imposing
an endogenously determined level of advertising which will be provided by homogeneous
advertisers, the analysis shows that the monopolistic streaming service increases the price
for its flat-rate subscribers in order to stimulate free-of-charge demand and to capture higher
revenues from advertisers. An extension of the model by illegal file-sharing reveals that an
increase in copyright enforcement shifts rents from music consumers to the monopolistic
provider, moreover a maximal punishment for piracy will be welfare-maximizing.
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1 Introduction
Music labels suffer great losses since music is amenable to digitalization and everyone who is
able to handle a personal computer may download music free-of-charge from hundreds of P2P-
file-sharing-platforms.1 Although this proceeding is illegal, the mass of offered platforms and
transactions on them makes it impossible for owners of the respective artwork to enforce their
copyrights. According to the IFPI Digital Music Report 2010, global sales of record companies
in the digital era have been declined by around 30 per cent from 2004 to 2009. At the same time,
opening up new sources of income from digital markets gained in massive importance for the
music industry. In 2003, the digital music store iTunes was launched and it was reported that
in 2009 the share of global revenues of record companies which was generated through digital
channels was about 27% and grew by about 12% as compared with 2008 (see IFPI 2010). In the
US market, the volume of digital music sales grew from $0.2 billion to $3.1 billion from 2004 to
2009.2 Thus, it is straightforward that the music industry experiences a tremendous transfor-
mation process.3 Recently, many ideas have emerged to explore new sources of revenues for the
beleaguered music industry from digital markets.4 Technical progress and growing availability
of online services let recently upcoming business models, which provide a service allowing for
listening to streaming music on the internet, enormously gain in importance.5
Such business models initiated this paper which should provide a theoretical economic analysis
of the performance of a monopolistic provider which intends to launch a business model to make
profit from streaming music. The underlying idea consists in inducing music consumers to listen
on demand to music from the so called ”cloud” on the internet instead of possessing this music
1 In the US market for example, total revenues of the music industry fell from $ 14.6 billion to $ 6.3 billion
from 1999 (the year of birth of the file-sharing network Napster) to 2009 (See: ”Music’s lost decade: Sales
cut in half” by David Goldman (http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster music industry/,
February 3, 2010; last consulted on March 25, 2011)).
2 See: RIAA, American Music Business Brochure (http://76.74.24.142/2DB721AD-3A69-11D3-1FA4-
E3E59BEC0CE6.pdf, last consulted on April 3, 2011).
3 A detailed survey concerning the economic aspects of digitalized music is provided by Peitz and Waelbroeck
(2006). Liebowitz (2006) specifically focusses on the impact of file-sharing on the music industry.
4 Such ideas also include business models funded on payments on a voluntary basis. Regner and Barria (2009)
investigated the voluntary willingness to pay for an album of customers of the online music label Magnatune,
after they had the possibility to listen to free samples, and they find out that customers pay far more than the
minimum price charged by the label.
5 In 2009 Eric Daugan, Senior Vice President, Commercial Strategy, Warner Music International EMEA, enun-
ciated the future of selling music as ’a vision that music is available everywhere, at any time and in any place,
but the biggest question is how do we monetise it in an environment of widespread piracy?’ (see: IFPI (2010)).
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physically in the form of digitized files.6 Such business models are basically financed through
two sources. First, users can listen free-of-charge to music which will be interrupted by com-
mercial breaks between the particular songs. Beside this free-of-charge access, music consumers
is given the possibility to sign flat-rate contracts in order to gain unlimited access to the con-
tent of the streaming service as well as further benefits like offline listening and applications for
smartphones or tablet computers which enable listening of streaming music on mobile devices.
Furthermore, the music provided by the flat-rate business is of better technical quality.
The importance of the enormously growing streaming business is supported by having a closer
look on the development of the digital music database Spotify which was launched in Sweden in
2006.7 According to the Financial Times, the content of Spotify contains now more than ten
million songs and is used by more than ten million people across Europe. But it is still a point
of criticism that only fewer than one million subscribers actually use the advertising-free pre-
mium service and pay a monthly charge, and although it reported enormous growth rates in the
acquisition of subscribers, Spotify made losses of £16.6m according to its 2009 annual report.8
But one has to mention that 2 years are a quite long period regarding e-business models and
actually, Spotify is into negotiations with the four big major labels to launch its business in the
USA and it received large inputs from investors letting them achieve a billion-dollar valuation.9
Moreover, a business cooperation with Facebook is planned allowing facebook users for listening
to streaming music and for sharing it with their friends.10
In countries like Germany, where interests of artists are defended by strong copyright protection,
the launch of streaming services is strongly regulated.11 Actually, the start-up business Simfy,
6 Long way before the launch of streaming business models, namely in 2005, the Indicare project, which inves-
tigates consumer issues of Digital Rights Management, published a survey within 51 percent of the surveyed
music consumers respond that listening of music is of higher importance for them than storing (see: Indicare
(2005)).
7 The business model of spotify will be the archetype for the theoretical modelling.
8 See: ”Spotify to expand music service despite losses of £16m” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11821021,
November 23, 2010; last consulted on February 25, 2011).
9 See: ”Fundraising to lift Spotify to $1bn valuation” by Tim Bradshaw and Andrew Edgecliffe-
Johnson (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/743bbb6e-3ded-11e0-99ac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Exps1eSj, Febru-
ary 21, 2011; last consulted on February 25, 2011).
10 See: ”Facebook to partner with spotify” by Shane Richmond (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/8538810/Facebook-to-partner-with-Spotify.html, May 26, 2011; last consulted on May
31, 2011).
11 The German property rights organization ”Gesellschaft fu¨r musikalische Auffu¨hrungs- und
Vervielfa¨ltigungsrechte” (GEMA) successfully prevents a launch of Spotify.
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which has about eight millions songs available in its content and which has made agreements
with the most important record labels as well as with the GEMA, is the most significant provider
of streaming music in the German market.12 Despite the versatile criticism, it seems that major
labels invest hope in streaming business models as a future source of income. In the case of
Spotify, licensing agreements with all the four important major record labels (Universal, Sony
BMG, EMI and Warner) were made. Moreover, all these four big record labels have been re-
portedly invested in Spotify.13 Thus, it seems that streaming music business models are gaining
in importance for music labels which search for alternative forms of funding. The increased
appropriability of online market places and the advantages of the web 2.0 paved the way for the
implementation of services intending to take revenues from cloud computing. The innovative
and revolutionary character of such business models is visible in accounts allowing for features
for mobile devices and offline listening what leads to redundancy of the physical storage of dig-
itized music files.
This paper aims for providing a theoretical model which investigates strategic decisions of a sin-
gle online streaming service which intends to launch a business which is on the one hand funded
by advertising and on the other hand by charging its users. The assumption of a monopoly
simplifies the analysis insofar as one can focus on the strategic choice of the subscribers be-
tween the respective businesses without having to consider a differentiated content of competing
providers.14 The ad-funded free-of-charge business is modeled as a two-sided market model with
cross-group externalities15, where the streaming service acts as a platform which tries to acquire
subscribers on the one side of the market and advertising firms on the other side. Those firms
placing ads on the online platform intend to reach free-of-charge subscribers in order to win them
12 See: ”Ho¨ren statt besitzen” (http://newsticker.sueddeutsche.de/list/id/1122076, March 9, 2011; last consulted
on March 9, 2011). Moreover, with 1.777.867 visits in October 2010, Simfy is listed on number two on the
top-five newcomer list of the German online magazine Meedia. (See: ”Gewinner und Verlierer der Online-IVW”
(http://meedia.de/nc/details-topstory/article/die-gewinner-und-verlierer-der-online-ivw 100031402.html; last
consulted on March 30, 2011)).
13 See: ”Behind the music: The real reason why the major labels love Spotify” by Helienne Lindvall
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2009/aug/17/major-labels-spotify, August 17, 2009; last con-
sulted on February 26, 2011).
14 The assumption of a monopolistic market structure is supported by the Swedish market where Spotify registers
enormous growth rates and is actually assumed to be used by almost 15 percent of the population (See:
”Spotify defends business model” by Tim Bradshaw (http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/edb427aa-262f-11df-aff3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Ey5Zom00, March 2, 2010; last consulted on February 25, 2011).
15 Firms which place an ad benefit from an increasing size of subscribers, while subscribers suffer from an increase
in commercials. We assume subscribers not to gain from information provided by advertising firms. Following
the notation in Anderson and Coate (2005), commercial breaks are a nuisance for subscribers.
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over customers. In contrast, the flat-rate business is a direct transaction between the streaming
service and those subscribers who decide to sign a flat-rate contract and who are willing to pay
a monthly flat fee. Figure 1 illustrates all interactions between the agents in the model.
advertising
firms
monopolistic
provider of
streaming music
subscribers
pay enogenously 
determined charge
to attend subscribers 
decide whether to
pay the flat fee or not
to pay but tolerate ads
advertising
 funded,
free-of-charge
business 
flat-rate
business 
Figure 1: Online streaming business of a monopolistic provider
The modelling structure is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the streaming service announces
the flat fee pb as well as the charge r which has to be payed by one advertising firm in order
to broadcast its commercial. In the second stage, homogeneous advertising firms observe the
flat-rate price pb and the charge r and simultaneously decide whether to place a commercial
or not. The number of advertising firms a, which are willing to place their ad, is determined
by a free-entry equilibrium, meaning that advertisers only face the charge r as costs, and thus
demand for advertising space until their profits are driven down to zero. For simplicity we make
the assumption that advertising firms place only one commercial which is perceived by each free-
of-charge subscriber. Thus, a is indeed the number of commercials which has to be tolerated by
free-of-charge users. Finally, in the third stage, all potential subscribers decide independently
whether to subscribe to the flat-rate business, to the free-of-charge business or not to become a
user of the streaming service at all. The model is solved by backward induction and thus, the
investigation starts with the determination of the demand of potential users. This modelling
approach yields the main result that ad-funding is highly profitable when commercial breaks
impose a weak nuisance to free-of-charge users and that a monopolist increases its flat fee in
order to induce flat-rate users to switch to the ad-funded business.
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2 Related Literature
Despite the promising launch of Spotify or Simfy it is currently inevitable that one has to assess
that streaming services still do not earn enough revenues to compensate artists sufficiently.16
The trend is towards that musicians are increasingly forced to gain revenues from complemen-
tary products and services to their music. This includes ticket sales for live performances17 as
well as merchandising. Gayer and Shy (2006) develop such a model and show that free-of-charge
provision of music, namely piracy, increases popularity of an artist and therefore increases the
demand for complementary products and services to the artist’s music. In addition to an increase
in the sales of complementary goods, free-of-charge music listening can lead to a positive effect
on revenues due to sampling. The idea behind is that music consumers can use free-of-charge
music in order to prescreen the variety of music they are interested in, and then they are assumed
to be willing to pay for the original material if they find a perfect match between the music
and their preferences. Listening of advertising financed free-of-charge streaming music can be
seen as an approach to promote sampling trusting to engender a benefit for the music industry.
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) develop such a theoretical model which predicts that free-of-charge
listening may let the profits of music labels increase. Ducheˆne and Waelbroeck (2006) called
such a strategy of the music industry where music listeners expend effort to acquire information
about music which can lead to a purchase decision an ’information-pull technology’. A further
approach, emphasizing the benefits of free-of-charge music listening, is provided by Gayer and
Shy (2005) who argue that network effects can be related to the music market. They suppose
that an increasing number of free-of-charge listeners enhance the value of music for legal buyers
and, given a sufficiently large network effect, also increases profits of a monopolistic provider. Of
course, within these models free-of-charge listening is identical to illegal downloading. A survey
concerning the theory of digital piracy is provided by Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). Our model
contributes to the theory of digital file-sharing by an extension allowing music consumers for
downloading music illegally under consideration of direct costs due to the expected punishment
through legal enforcement.
16 One million plays of Lady Gaga’s song ”Poker Face” earned the artist $ 167 (See: ”Spotify rejects claims that it
’rips off artists’” by Emma Barnett (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/7590782/Spotify-rejects-claims-
that-it-rips-off-artists.html), April 14, 2010; last consulted on March 9, 2011) .
17 This development is supported by Krueger (2005) who surveys that from 2000 to 2003 ticket prices for live
performances sharply increased compared to the growth of inflation.
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Beyond the literature which investigates the difficulties for the music industry to generate rev-
enues due to digitalization of music, this paper attends to contribute to the theory of two-sided
markets.18 The paper is closely related to the investigation of informative advertising on media
platforms by Armstrong (2006). In recent years advertising on media platforms attracted a lot
of attention. Most of the literature deals with media platforms competing for customers in ad-
vertising as well as in content. Such models which investigate spatial competition with respect
to the programming of media platforms and which assume advertisers competing strategically
by placing their ads on the respective media platforms, are for example developed by Gal-Or and
Dukes (2003) or by Gantman and Shy (2007). Jay Pil Choi (2006) investigates the reverse effects
of the number of market entrants and the level of advertising on social welfare in a free-entry
model. Armstrong and Weeds (2007) show (in a duopoly with vertical quality differentiation)
that programme quality is higher under charged access than under advertising funding. Two
noteworthy articles investigating social optimality of advertising with respect to the nuisance
of advertising are those by Anderson and Coate (2005) and by Peitz and Valleti (2008). Both
articles show that the level of advertising is either too high or too low depending on the one
side on the nuisance customers have to bear from commercials and on the other side on the
willingness to pay of advertisers to contact customers.
In contrast to the aforementioned articles, our model endogenizes the demand of the advertis-
ers for advertising space by implementing a free-entry equilibrium which drives the profit of
homogeneous advertisers down to zero and which eliminates strategical behavior of advertisers.
Reisinger (2011) analyses a model in which two platforms, which are differentiated on the user
market, compete for homogeneous advertisers and demonstrates the importance of the interde-
pendency between the degree of differentiation and the nuisance created by commercials on the
equilibrium profits of the platforms. In contrast, our framework considers a monopolistic firm
which intends to launch two different business models. Users are therefore not differentiated
horizontally in the sense that they prefer a certain characteristic of a product, but rather verti-
cally, in the sense that they have to choose between two degrees of quality of the same product,
namely the provision of streaming music.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is solved for the equilibrium in section 3 con-
taining three types of agents, namely the streaming service, advertisers and subscribers and
18 The notion ”two-sided market” was introduced by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006).
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addresses welfare-theoretical aspects concerning advertising. Section 4 extends the model by
considering illegal file-sharing. The monopolist maximizes its profit under a given prosecution
for piracy. Finally, music consumers’ aggregate surplus and social welfare under intensification
of legal enforcement is investigated. Section 5 concludes.
3 The Model
3.1 Subscribers
Consider a market which is served by a monopolistic online streaming service which intends
to attract a mass of potential subscribers. Those subscribers strategically decide according to
a given level of commercials a and a given flat price pb whether to sign a flat-rate contract,
to subscribe to the free-of-charge business or to refuse to subscribe to the streaming service
at all.19 All subscribers are supposed to be homogeneous except for their preference type θ
which ranges them according to an ascending ’addiction to music’. The preference parameter
θ is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], with a cumulative distribution
function F (θ).20 Subscribers who are characterized by a low θ are more likely to listen to
advertising or to refuse to subscribe than to pay the flat-rate price. Those subscribers are
assumed to value unlimited listening to music and a higher streaming rate or further benefits,
like mobile applications and offline listening, not that much. Subscribers who decide to use
the free-of-charge business have to tolerate a certain level of advertising a which creates a
decrease in the gross value of music, measured by the nuisance costs parameter δ which is
identical for all potential subscribers. In contrast, users of a flat-rate subscription are supposed
to prefer ad-free unlimited listening, a high streaming rate and additional features. In order
to get premium access, they have to pay a flat-rate price pb. Finally, vA can be described as
intrinsic values of the ’low-quality’-streaming service provided by a free-of-charge subscription,
while vB is the intrinsic value of the ’high-quality’-streaming service provided by a charged
subscription.21 Therefore one has to impose the following assumption:
19 The derivation of the demand functions for the business model is closely related to Spiegel and Yehezkel (2003).
20 This allows us to define percentages allocating all potential subscribers to either the flat-rate business, the
free-of-charge business or to refusal of streaming music.
21 As already mentioned, such a ’high-quality’-subscription is characterized by a higher streaming rate, unlimited
access and mobile applications.
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Assumption 1. vB > vA.
The terms θvB and θvA therefore describe a respective subscriber’s gross valuation for a given
music content with a quality that fits best to the preferences of this subscriber. Suppose that
the net valuation of a given subscriber of a subscription depending on her or his addiction to
music can be measured by her or his utility which can be written as
Uθ =


θvA − δa free-of-charge subscription
θvB − p
b flat-rate subscription
0 otherwise.
(1)
Note that when pb ≤ δavA/vB, no potential user will voluntarily subscribe to the free-of-charge
business and the monopolist solely sells flat-rate contracts. In contrast, when pb > δavA/vB,
there will be a positive demand for the free-of-charge as well as for the flat-rate business.22
Introducing the variable θ̂ allows for the definition of the lowest type of a user who will subscribe
to the flat-rate business, whereas θ determines the indifference level between the free-of-charge
business and not subscribing at all. One obtains that
θ̂ = Max
{
pb − δa
vB − vA
,
pb
vB
}
(2)
and
θ =
δa
vA
. (3)
All potential users with θ ≥ θ̂ subscribe to the flat-rate business, while all potential users with
θ ≤ θ < θ̂ subscribe to the free-of-charge business. Note that it is not beneficial for all potential
users to become an online-streaming listener, those potential users are characterized by θ < θ.
The respective demand functions for the free-of-charge business can therefore be written as
22 Precondition is that pb < vB .
8
DA = Max
{
(1− θ), (θ̂ − θ), 0
}
which is equivalent to
DA =


vA−δa
vA
for pb ≥ vB and vA > δa
vAp
b−vBδa
vA(vB−vA)
for pb > δavA/vB
0 for δa ≥ vA.
(4)
The demand for the flat-rate business is DB = Max
{
(1− θ̂), 0
}
and is given by
DB =


(vB−vA)−p
b+δa
(vB−vA)
for pb > δavA/vB
vB−p
b
vB
for pb ≤ δavA/vB
0 for pb ≥ vB.
(5)
Suppose that the monopolist chooses its strategic variables in order to launch both businesses.
Thus, it is not surprising that the demand for the free-of-charge business is negatively dependent
on the nuisance caused by advertising and positively dependent on the flat-rate price. One
can observe that an increasing quality differentiation (vB − vA) causes a negative impact on
the demand for the free-of-charge business. The demand for the flat-rate business is reversely
dependent on these variables. Note that an increasing nuisance created by advertising causes
a subscriber drift ’on both sides’ of the interval which determines the demand for the free-of-
charge business. On the one hand, subscribers with a low θ tend to quit their free-of-charge
subscription, as the nuisance from advertising exceeds their gross valuation θvA. On the other
hand, it is getting more attractive for subscribers characterized by a high θ, who have been
listened to advertisement so far, to shift from the free-of-charge business to the flat-rate business.
3.2 Advertisers
In the second stage of the model, firms should be investigated which specify their demand for
advertising space and which therefore fund the free-of-charge business.23 Suppose that there
are many advertisers who have to decide either to place exactly one commercial or not. If this
commercial is placed, it is assumed to reach all subscribers to the free-of-charge business. As is
customary in two-sided market models dealing with advertising, cross-externalities occur. The
23 For a better understanding, if it is referred to these firms, they are defined as advertisers.
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demand for advertising space is positively dependent on the demand of subscribers for the free-
of-charge business, while the demand for the ad-funded business decreases with an increasing
level of commercials.
Advertisers know the flat-rate price as well as the charge they have to pay what allows them
for anticipating the equilibrium level of commercials on the free-of-charge business. This level is
equal to the number of advertisers who decide to place a commercial in equilibrium, meaning that
the streaming service broadcasts each commercial which is supplied to it. Each advertiser faces
costs which solely consist of the charge r which is of identical extent for all advertisers and which
is asked by the streaming service in order to place a commercial. Thus, the streaming service
may strategically regulate the equilibrium level of commercials by varying r. By anticipating
the level of commercials as well as by knowing the flat-rate price, advertisers may estimate the
equilibrium demand for the free-of-charge business. To reach one free-of-charge subscriber with
its commercial is of a certain value for an advertiser. The parameter σ represents this value.
All advertisers are supposed to provide homogeneous services or products and can therefore be
assumed to be homogeneous with respect to σ.24 Without loss of generality one can suppose
that the marginal costs of the production of a commercial can be set equal to zero.
It follows that a representative advertiser generates a profit of pia = DAσ − r from placing a
commercial on the free-of-charge business which can be written as
pia =


(
vA−δa
vA
)
σ − r for pb ≥ vB and vA > δa(
vAp
b−vBδa
vA(vB−vA)
)
σ − r for pb > δavA/vB
0 otherwise.
(6)
Suppose now that the monopolist intends to launch an ad-funded business. Because of their
homogeneity, strategic interaction between advertisers is absent. To determine the level of com-
mercials, free-entry in equilibrium is assumed, meaning that advertisers demand for advertising
space until their profits vanish.25 According to the charge r, advertisers place commercials until
24 This is in contrast to the nascent literature concerning the provision of advertising on media platforms (See
e.g. Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006), Anderson and Coate (2005) and Peitz and Valletti (2008) who describe
advertisers as producers of products being differentiated by characteristics what makes them more or less
interesting for potential customers.)
25 The assumption of a free-entry equilibrium is in the spirit of the concept of Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition, of course with the distinction that advertisers do not compete in a differentiated product space.
This allows for neglecting strategic aspects of advertising, but rather focusing on the level of commercials.
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the demand of the free-of-charge business decreased in a way that all advertisers who have been
placed a commercial in equilibrium make zero profit. The endogenously determined level of
commercials which will be broadcasted by the streaming service can be computed by equating
the profit function of one representative advertiser with zero and by solving for a and thus, one
obtains
a˜(pb, r) =


vA(σ−r)
δσ
for pb ≥ vB and vA > δa
vA(σp
b−r(vB−vA))
δσvB
for pb > δavA/vB.
(7)
If one focuses on the benchmark case in which the monopolist intends to simultaneously launch
an ad-funded and a flat-rate business, an increasing charge r as well as an increasing difference
between the intrinsic values of the respective businesses let a˜(pb, r) decrease, while an increasing
flat-rate price induces advertisers to raise their demand for advertising space. The charge r will
be determined in a way that the revenues of the monopolistic streaming service from advertising
are maximized. By using a˜(pb, r) one can derive the demand functions for the ad-funded business
DA(a˜) as well as for the flat-rate business DB(a˜) depending on the level of commercials which
will be placed according to the equilibrium advertising charge and the equilibrium flat fee. Those
demand functions are given by
DA(a˜) =
r
σ
(8)
and
DB(a˜) =
σ(vB − p
b)− rvA
σvB
. (9)
Equation (9) determines the demand for the flat-rate business if one considers potential users
being informed about the equilibrium flat fee as well as about the level of commercials they
have to tolerate in equilibrium if they subscribe to the free-of-charge business. The demand for
the free-of-charge business with respect to the equilibrium advertising level and the equilibrium
flat-rate price (8) is simply the relation between the equilibrium advertising charge and the
valuation of one advertiser to reach one free-of-charge subscriber.
3.3 Streaming Service
In this section, the benchmark case in which the streaming service launches both businesses is
considered. Thus, the streaming service provides an endogenously determined level of advertising
a∗ at the equilibrium charge r∗ and sets the flat-rate price p∗ to derive a profit maximizing
allocation of subscribers to its businesses. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the
monopolistic streaming service faces neither marginal costs nor fixed costs in the provision of
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its businesses and therefore revenues are tantamount to profits.26 If one has a closer look on
ad-funding, the revenue per subscriber which can be generated by the streaming service is given
by
β(pb, r) =
a˜r
DA
(10)
which is just the relation between the revenues from advertisers and the demand for the free-of-
charge business. Inserting (8) yields
β(a˜) = a˜σ (11)
which can be computed as the number of advertisers who decide to place a commercial multiplied
by their valuation to reach one free-of-charge subscriber. Multiplying β(a˜) by the demand for
the free-of-charge business DA(a˜) leads us back to the total revenue from advertising which is
given by a˜r. The total profit of the monopolistic streaming service can therefore be written in
a two-way manner and is given by
piM = β(a˜)DA(a˜) +DB(a˜)p
b (12)
which is equivalent to
piM = a˜r +DB(a˜)p
b. (13)
In what follows, equation (13) will be used. Inserting (7) as well as the deduced demand for the
flat-rate business (9) in (13) yields
piM =
(
pbσ − r(vB − vA)
δvBσ
)
r +
(
σ(vB − p
b)− rvA
σvB
)
pb. (14)
The streaming service uses the two strategic variables r and pb to maximize its profit. The
maximization problem therefore results in the two first-order conditions ∂piM/∂r = 0 and
∂piM/∂pb = 0. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, the following restriction on parameter
values must hold.
Assumption 2. 4δσvB > vA(δ + σ)
2.
26 An interesting extension of our model would be the consideration of musicians or music labels who decide
whether to make their artwork available for such a business model or not. By doing this, royalties for artists
and labels could be considered as the costs of the streaming service.
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Solving for δ, one derives the lower threshold of the nuisance parameter
δmin =
2vBσ − vAσ − 2
√
σ2vB(vB − vA)
vA
. (15)
For all values δ > δmin, the profit function of the streaming service is concave in r and pb. A
detailed derivation is provided in the Appendix.
First order conditions from profit maximization can be written as
r∗ =
pb(σ − δ)
2(vB − vA)
(16)
and
pb∗ =
vB
2
+
rvA(σ − δ)
2σδ
. (17)
As long as σ exceeds δ and Assumption 1 holds, the equilibrium flat-rate price and advertising
charge are strictly positive and linearly interdependent. The investigation is restricted to cases
in which no subsidization of advertisers or flat-rate subscribers is allowed, implying that the
charge as well as the flat-rate price have to be positive. The fact that the equilibrium charge is
positively dependent on the flat-rate price seems to be counterintuitive at the first sight. Imagine
that the monopolist asks for a high flat fee in equilibrium. Two resulting effects on the free-
of-charge equilibrium demand can be observed. First, a high flat-rate price induces potential
users with a relatively high addiction to music to choose a free-of-charge subscription instead
of a flat-rate subscription. Second, advertisers expect the resulting high free-of-charge demand
and are therefore willing to place a high level of commercials. Potential users characterized
by a low addiction to music would therefore be better off with a refusal of a subscription.
Hence, the monopolist will choose a high equilibrium charge which allows for capturing a bigger
surplus from less advertisers and which offsets the loss of free-of-charge subscribers due to an
increase in ads. Commercials in equilibrium will thus be relatively expensive and will persist on
a rather moderate level. Vice versa, the equilibrium flat-rate price is positively dependent on
the advertising charge. An explanation of this strategic behavior of the monopolistic streaming
service (by taking account of the nuisance from advertising) will be provided in the following
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section. Solving the linear system (16) - (17) yields
r∗∗ =
vBδσ(σ − δ)
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
(18)
and
pb∗∗ =
2vBδσ(vB − vA)
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
. (19)
From Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 one can perceive that pb∗∗ is strictly positive. The same
is true for r∗∗ as long as σ exceeds the nuisance cost parameter δ.
Inserting (18) and (19) in (7) yields the equilibrium level of advertising which is given by
a∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) =
vA(vB − vA)(δ + σ)
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
. (20)
One can see that this equilibrium level of commercials is strictly positive as long as Assumption
1 and Assumption 2 hold. These results allow now for performing a comparative static analysis
with respect to the nuisance cost parameter δ.
3.4 Equilibrium Analysis
The flat-rate price and the charge for advertisers in the static equilibrium arise as a result of
the level of nuisance created by advertising. This section provides a detailed analysis of the
equilibrium outcome according to the parameter δ which measures this annoyance created
by commercials on the free-of-charge version. The purpose is to show how δ influences the
monopolist’s decision whether to launch both business or just one of them in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. A monopolistic streaming service only imposes a mixed funded business model
consisting of a coexisting advertising funded and flat-rate business within the nuisance bounds
δ ∈ [ vAσ2vB−vA , σ]. For δ ∈ [δ
min, vAσ2vB−vA ], profits will solely be generated from launching an
ad-funded business, while for δ ≥ σ, nuisance from commercials reaches a level such that the
monopolist maximizes its profit by solely selling flat-rate contracts.
Proof. By using (2) and (3) as well as (19) and (20) one can derive the position of those
indifferent subscribers θ∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) and θ̂∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) who determine the equilibrium demand for
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the free-of-charge as well as for the flat-rate business and who are given by
θ∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) =
δ(vB − vA)(δ + σ)
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
(21)
and
θ̂∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) =
δ(2vBσ − vA(δ + σ))
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
. (22)
To derive a segmental allocation of potential users in equilibrium which ensures the ex-
istence of a mixed funded business, θ∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) must fall below of θ̂∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗). Solving
θ∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) = θ̂∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) for δ yields δmax = σ which determines the upper nuisance
parameter bound for which this constraint is fulfilled. It follows that all values of the nuisance
parameter which fall short of the advertisers’ valuation to reach one single subscriber fulfill
the constraint θ∗ ≤ θ̂∗. A second constraint which will be necessary to enable a mixed funded
business in equilibrium is fulfilled if θ̂∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗) ≤ 1. Solving this equation for δ let us derive
the lower bound of the nuisance parameter δ̂ = vAσ2vB−vA , for which a monopolistic streaming
service launches a mixed funded business in equilibrium. Note that δ̂ > δmin which imposes a
stronger restriction than Assumption 2. 
Proposition 2. Within the interval [δ̂, δmax], a monopolistic streaming service sets its highest
equilibrium flat-rate price as well as its highest equilibrium advertising charge at δ = δ̂, where
the demand for the free-of-charge business as well as the level of commercials will reach their
maximum. The same is true for the profit of the monopolistic streaming service which is
maximal at the lower nuisance threshold δ̂.
Proof. First of all, pb∗∗(δ) as well as r∗∗(δ) should be maximized and minimized with respect
to δ within the nuisance parameter thresholds imposed by Proposition 1. By setting up this
maximization problem we have to consider the constraints of Assumption 1, namely that vB
must exceed vA and non-negativity of all variables and parameters is assumed. The results are
presented in Table 1. In the left column, the arguments of the maximum and the minimum of
pb∗∗ and r∗∗ with respect to δ are listed. The right column lists the associated maximal and
minimal values of pb∗∗ and r∗∗ within [δ̂, δmax]. An interesting observation is that pb∗∗(δ̂) exceeds
pb∗∗(δmax). This is always true as long as Assumption 1 is binding. Moreover, the monopolist
asks for its maximal equilibrium flat-rate price when the aversion against advertising is at the
lower bound δ̂ for which a mixed funded business will be launched. The equilibrium flat-rate price
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is a decreasing function in within the interval [δ̂, δmax]. This result is due to the interdependency
of the equilibrium flat-rate price and the equilibrium charge which determine the equilibrium
level of commercials and the resulting demand functions. When δ converges to δ̂ the equilibrium
charge for advertisers sharply increases.
δ pb∗∗(δ), r∗∗(δ)
argmax
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
pb∗∗(δ) δ̂ = vAσ2vB−vA vB −
vA
2
argmin
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
pb∗∗(δ) δmax = σ vB2
argmax
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
r∗∗(δ) δ̂ = vAσ2vB−vA
σ
2
argmin
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
r∗∗(δ) δmax = σ 0
Table 1: Equilibrium flat-rate prices and advertising charges depending on δ within the interval
[δ̂, δmax].
The economic intuition behind is that for values of δ around δ̂, the demand for the free-of-charge
business and therefore the supply of commercials is of such an extent, that the streaming service
maximizes its profits not only by increasing its advertising charge, but also by increasing its
flat-rate price in order to induce more subscribers to quit their flat-rate contracts and to become
free-of-charge users. Thus, when δ is on a low level, it turns out to be a greater benefit for
the monopolist to charge a high flat-rate price in equilibrium in order to induce users to shift
from the flat-rate to the free-of-charge business, than to keep these users as flat-rate subscribers
by imposing a moderate flat fee. In contrast, when δ is on a high level around σ, the demand
for the free-of-charge business will turn to zero. Hence, the monopolist relies on its flat-rate
business and intends to acquire regular users by charging a moderate flat fee. Further inside
can be gained from the equilibrium demand functions for the respective businesses. Therefore
the equilibrium flat-rate price and the resulting level of commercials are inserted in (4) and (5)
and the equilibrium demand functions for the respective businesses can be written as
D∗A(p
b∗∗, r∗∗, δ) =
δvB(σ − δ)
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
(23)
and
D∗B(p
b∗∗, r∗∗, δ) =
σ(2vBδ − vA(δ + σ))
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
. (24)
The equilibrium demand for the flat-rate business reaches its maximum at δmax, while the
the demand for the free-of-charge offer will be maximal at δ̂ within the bounds introduced by
Proposition 1. Again, one has to consider the familiar restraints and computing the argument
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of the maximum of D∗B and D
∗
A with respect to δ on the interval [δ̂, δ
max] yields
argmax
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
D∗B = σ = δ
max
and
argmax
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
D∗A =
vAσ
2vB − vA
= δ̂.
D∗A(δ̂) as well as D
∗
B(δ
max) are computed as 1/2 meaning that at most half of all potential users
subscribe to either one of the two businesses. Unsurprisingly, one can observe the argument of
the minimum of D∗B with respect to δ at δ̂, while the argument of the minimum of D
∗
A with
respect to δ can be observed at δmax. Inserting δmax in (23) yields D∗A(δ
max) = 0, as well as
inserting δ̂ in (24) yields D∗B(δ̂) = 0.
At δmax, the monopolist sets its flat-rate price and advertising charge in order that no free-of-
charge business will be launched. In contrast, a low nuisance from advertising accompanied by a
high flat fee implies an increase in the equilibrium demand for the free-of-charge business, while
the demand for the flat-rate business turns to zero at δ̂. The increasing equilibrium demand for
the free-of-charge business is only dampened by the equilibrium level of commercials which will
be maximal at δ̂.27
Turning next to a closer look at equilibrium revenues generated by the monopolistic streaming
service from launching the respective businesses. Multiplying (20) by (18) yields the equilibrium
revenue function from launching a free-of-charge business
R∗A(δ) = a
∗r∗∗ =
vAvBδσ(vA − vB)(δ − σ)(δ + σ)
(vA(δ + σ)2 − 4vBδσ)
2 . (25)
Not surprisingly (and in line with the behavior of D∗A, a
∗ and r∗∗ with respect to δ) equilibrium
revenues from the funds of the advertisers will be lower, the higher δ is and they will be zero
when δ converges to σ. The higher the degree, users feel interrupted by advertising, the less will
subscribe to the free-of-charge business and consequently, the less advertisers decide to place
commercials in equilibrium forcing the streaming service to ask for a lower advertising charge.
In contrast, one can observe the maximum equilibrium revenue from advertising within [δ̂, δmax]
27 The maximum equilibrium level of advertising which is given by max
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]a
∗(δ) =
2vB − vA
2σ
, can be
observed at δ̂.
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at
argmax
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
R∗A(δ) =
vAσ
2vB − vA
= δ̂
and the resulting maximum equilibrium revenue from ad-funding is
max
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
R∗A(δ) = R
∗
A(δ̂) =
(2vB − vA)
4
.
Focusing on the flat-rate business, equilibrium revenues are
R∗B(δ) = D
∗
Bp
b∗∗ =
2vBδσ
2(vB − vA)(2δvB − vA(δ + σ))
(vA(δ + σ)2 − 4vBδσ)
2 . (26)
Of course, equilibrium revenues from launching a flat-rate business behave conversely to the
revenues from advertising within [δ̂, δmax]. Searching for the argument of the maximum yields
argmax
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
R∗B(δ) = σ = δ
max.
Just like the equilibrium demand for the flat-rate business, equilibrium revenues from launching
a flat-rate business turn to zero when δ converges to δ̂. The respective maximally attainable
equilibrium revenue from implementing a flat-rate business within [δ̂, δmax] at δmax is
max
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
R∗B(δ) = R
∗
B(δ
max) =
vB
4
.
It is remarkable that R∗B(δ
max) always falls below of R∗A(δ̂) as long as vB > vA is binding,
meaning that the streaming service benefits from a low equilibrium nuisance level created by
advertising and the resulting gain in importance of the free-of-charge business.
Equilibrium revenue functions must intersect within the interval [δ̂, δmax]. Equating (25) and
(26) and solving for δ yields the point of intersection
δ˜ =
σ(vA − 2vB) + 2
√
σ2(v2A + v
2
B − vAvB)
vA
. (27)
Finally, the monopolistic streaming service achieves a total equilibrium profit which can be
determined as the summation of the equilibrium revenue functions from the respective businesses
and which can therefore be written as
piM∗(pb∗∗, r∗∗, δ) =
δσvB(vB − vA)
4vBδσ − vA(δ + σ)2
. (28)
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Again, focusing attention on the investigation of piM∗ according to its argument of the maximum
as well as its argument of the minimum with respect to δ within [δ̂, δmax] yields
argmax
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
piM∗(δ) =
vAσ
2vB − vA
= δ̂
and
argmin
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
piM∗(δ) = σ = δmax.
The maximum equilibrium profit within [δ̂, δmax] can be observed at δ̂, that is with a profit
fully captured from ad-funds while the minimum equilibrium profit can be reached at δmax,
where the monopolist solely acquires flat-rate subscribers. However, the equilibrium profit of
the streaming service is a decreasing function as advertising becomes more of a nuisance, and
the associated maximal and minimal equilibrium profits can therefore be computed as
max
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
piM∗(δ) = piM∗(δ̂) =
(2vB − vA)
4
(29)
and
min
δ∈[δ̂,δmax]
piM∗(δ) = piM ∗(δmax) =
vB
4
. (30)
Thus, the monopolist is better off with a low aversion against commercial breaks in equilibrium
and the resulting focus on the ad-funded business. 
But it still remains to have a closer look at the revenues of the streaming service for values of δ
which do not allow for launching a mixed funded business in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. For values of δ outside of [δ̂, δmax], the monopolist generates the following
equilibrium revenues depending on δ:
• For δ ∈ [δmin, δ̂], the streaming service is solely financed through advertising. Nuisance
created by commercials breaks is small in such a way that it is profit maximizing for the
monopolist only to launch a free-of-charge business which yields a equilibrium profit of
piM∗(δ ≤ δ̂) = R∗A(δ ≤ δ̂) =
σvA
4δ
. (31)
• In contrast, for δ ∈ [δmax,∞], potential users are disturbed from advertising in a way that it
is profit maximizing for the monopolist to abandon ad-funding. The respective equilibrium
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profits which are solely generated by selling flat-rate contracts are thus given by
piM∗(δ ≥ δmax) = R∗B(δ ≥ δ
max) =
vB
4
. (32)
Proof. See Appendix.
These results can be clarified by employing a numerical plot. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium
revenue functions of the monopolist from the free-of-charge as well as from the flat-rate business
depending on δ. In doing so, the black and downward shaped curve illustrates total equilibrium
profits piM∗(δ). For values of δ ≤ δ̂ nuisance created by commercials is on such a low level that
equilibrium profits will solely consist of revenues from ad-funding and no flat-rate contracts will
be sold.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium revenues of the monopolistic streaming service with respect to δ. Note:
σ = 0.9, vA = 1000 and vB = 2000.
It is remarkable that piM∗(δ ≤ δ̂) sharply increases with a decreasing nuisance from advertising.
This is due to the structure of the model and can be explained by having a closer look on the
timing of the model. Consider a decreasing δ in equilibrium. Thus, advertising becomes less of
a nuisance for the users of streaming music. Before users decide to subscribe, advertisers expect
an increasing free-of-charge demand and therefore they increase advertising space. Albeit
potential users are now rather willing to listen to advertising, they would have to tolerate a
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larger equilibrium level of commercials if they decide to become a subscriber. Those effects
completely offset each other and the equilibrium number of subscribers is therefore independent
on δ and constant for values of δ ≤ δ̂. The entire revenue from advertisers will be captured
by the monopolist and if it does not implement a flat-rate business, the profit maximizing
advertising charge is just the equilibrium demand multiplied by σ. This combination of a
constant equilibrium advertising charge accompanied by an increasing advertising space which
does not create changes in the equilibrium free-of-charge demand due to a decreasing δ, allows
for generating huge profits from launching an ad-funded business.
For values of δ ∈ [δ̂, δmax], the streaming service maximizes its equilibrium profits by imposing
a mixed funded business. The red downward shaped curve illustrates the equilibrium revenues
from the free-of-charge business while the blue and upward sloped curve illustrates equilibrium
revenues from launching a flat-rate business. Total equilibrium profits slightly decrease within
this interval. For values of δ ≥ δmax, equilibrium demand for the free-of-charge business and
thus, ad-funding turns to zero. The equilibrium profit, which no longer depends on δ, is now
solely generated from launching a flat-rate business.
If one considers the revenue possibilities for the music industry, it seems as if it can be highly
beneficial for an online-streaming provider to launch either a mixed funded business or a
business model which does not charge its subscribers and which is financed by commercials.
Depending on the degree of aversion to commercials, a monopolistic streaming provider either
earns more from the ad-funded business or from the flat-rate business, but total equilibrium
profits are always greater than or equal to revenues from a pure flat-rate funding. But if the
aversion to commercial breaks exceeds a certain level, launching a flat-rate business remains
the only revenue source from streaming music in an equilibrium which is determined by a
monopolistic provider. However, the precondition for the assessment of profitability of such a
business model is to estimate the aversion to commercial breaks of the potential subscribers,
but detailed empirical research is needed to determine the disutility from advertising.
Proposition 4. Within the interval [δ̂, δmax], equilibrium revenues of the streaming service
and the aggregated equilibrium subscriber surplus drift apart with a decreasing nuisance from
advertising. The higher the marginal social benefit of one additional commercial depending on δ
is, the more excessive will be the equilibrium use of advertising of the streaming service in order
to siphon all benefits from advertisers at subscribers’ cost.
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Proof. It was demonstrated that a monopolistic streaming service only launches an ad-funded
business for values of δ < σ in equilibrium. From a perspective regarding social benefits from
advertising and under the assumptions that i) δ and σ are exogenously given and ii) free-entry
for advertisers is still binding, this implies that a monopolistic streaming service is only willing to
launch an advertising funded business if social benefits exceed social costs from advertising, and
if this social surplus from advertising can entirely be captured by the monopolist. The higher
the margin between δ and σ (and therefore social surplus from advertising) is in equilibrium, the
more excessive will be the level of commercial breaks and thus, the focusing on the free-of-charge
business. In a model which investigates competing media platforms which fund their business
by broadcasting advertising, Anderson and Coate (2005) found that the number of advertisers
takes an optimal level if the marginal social benefit and the marginal social cost of one additional
commercial are equated.28 Here, the social cost of one more commercial aired on the free-of-
charge business in equilibrium should be investigated compared to the social benefit. Therefore,
the streaming service reduces its charge to attract one additional advertiser, but the monopolist
is not supposed to react with an adjustment in the flat-rate price.29 Thus, the marginal social
cost consists on the one hand of the increased aggregated nuisance from advertising for free-of-
charge subscribers and on the other hand of the flat fee which has to be payed by those users, who
have been induced to switch from the free-of-charge to the flat-rate business. If one additional
commercial is aired in equilibrium, one can observe a shift of free-of-charge subscribers in both
directions: users with a low gross valuation for music will quit their free-of-charge subscription,
while those who are characterized by a high gross valuation for music will become flat-rate users.
From ∂DA/∂a < 0, it follows that a new number of free-of-charge users is now bothered by one
additional commercial, parameterized by δ. The marginal social cost of one more advertising
spot in equilibrium is therefore given by
MSC(a) = δ
(
∂DA
∂a
∂a
∂r
dr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dDA
+
(
∂DB
∂a
∂a
∂r
dr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dDB
pb. (33)
28 In this model, viewers single-home and start to switch off from a threshold determined by their gross benefit
from viewing (depending on the degree of differentiation between two competing platforms) and the nuisance
created by advertising.
29 Flat fees are often given by catchy amounts, like £9.99 for the Spotify premium account, familiarizing customers
with the service and therefore are reluctantly modified by the service.
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In contrast, the social benefit from one additional commercial in equilibrium is equal to the
marginal revenue of the monopolist. The streaming service gains the charge from the new
advertiser on its free-of-charge business which corresponds to the new reduced number of free-
of-charge users multiplied by σ. As is a cost for subscribers, the increase in the number of
subscribers to the flat-rate business multiplied by the price for a contract is a gain for the
monopolist. The marginal social benefit from one additional advertiser is therefore
MSB(a) = σ
(
∂DA
∂a
∂a
∂r
dr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dDA
+
(
∂DB
∂a
∂a
∂r
dr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dDB
pb. (34)
Thus, the difference between the marginal social benefit and the marginal social loss of one
more commercial is given by the margin between σ and δ and will be fully internalized by
the streaming service. Hence, the higher this margin is, the stronger will be the focus of the
streaming service on the free-of-charge business in equilibrium. The result can be clarified by
employing a numerical example. Aggregated short-term subscriber surplus
SS(δ) =
∫ p−δa
vB−vA
δa
vA
(θvA − δa)dθ +
∫ 1
p−δa
vB−vA
(θvB − p
b)dθ (35)
is the summation of the net valuations of all subscribers to the free-of-charge and the flat-rate
business. Inserting the equilibrium flat-rate price (19) and the equilibrium level of commercials
(20) yields
SS∗(δ) =
vB(4δ
2σ2v2B + δvAvB(δ
3 − 6δ2σ + δσ2 − 4σ3) + σv2A(2δ
3 + δ2σ + σ3))
2(vA(δ + σ)2 − 4δσvB)2
. (36)
Figure 4 plots the aggregated equilibrium subscriber surplus compared to the equilibrium profits
of the streaming service according to the nuisance cost parameter δ. Again, the black curve
illustrates equilibrium profits of the streaming service, while the red curve is the aggregated
equilibrium surplus of subscribers depending on the nuisance cost parameter δ. It is easy to see
that with a decreasing nuisance from advertising, the aggregated equilibrium subscriber surplus
and the equilibrium profits of the streaming service visibly drift apart for values of δ < δmax for
which an ad-funded business will be launched. For values of δ ≤ δ̂, the aggregated equilibrium
subscriber surplus is independent on δ and of a constant level. The same is true for values of
δ ≥ δmax.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium profits of the monopolistic streaming service compared to the aggregated
equilibrium subscriber surplus with respect to δ. Note: σ = 0.9, vA = 1000 and vB = 2000.
The proof of Proposition 3 showed that a variation of δ for δ ≤ δ̂, associated with the resulting
shift in commercials, is neutral in terms of the net valuation of the free-of-charge subscribers.
Thus, the equilibrium demand for the free-of-charge business as well as the aggregated equi-
librium surplus of the free-of-charge users remain constant. Said constant levels of aggregated
equilibrium subscriber surplus can be written as
SS∗(δ ≤ δ̂) =
∫ 1
δa∗(δ≤δ̂)
vA
(θvA − δa
∗(δ ≤ δ̂))dθ =
vA
8
(37)
and
SS∗(δ ≥ δmax) =
∫ 1
pb∗∗(δ≥δmax)
vB
(θvB − p
b∗∗(δ ≥ δmax))dθ =
vB
8
. (38)
The loss in aggregated equilibrium subscriber surplus within the interval [δ̂, δmax] is created
by those subscribers who are forced to switch from the flat-rate to the free-of-charge business
by the price, which will be increased by the monopolist due to a decrease in δ. For those
subscribers who are characterized by a relatively high gross valuation for music, it would be
rather beneficial to sign a flat-rate contract than to listen to advertising. 
The following section intends to shed light on a situation where potential users have an
alternative to the streaming service in terms of illegal file-sharing.
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4 Piracy
Advertising funded streaming services intend to generate profits for the music industry from
those music consumers who are not willing to pay for music. P2P file-sharing platforms allow
for access to music which is not charged and as it was mentioned in the introduction, are assumed
to be responsible for enormously swooning revenues of the music industry. Consider that piracy,
which appears in the form of illegally downloading of mp3-files, is now considered as alternative
for those subscribers who are not willing to pay the flat-rate price in order to listen to music
free of advertising.30
Suppose that the illegal download of music provides an intrinsic value of vP which is assumed
to exceed vA but to fall below vB. This strict assumption is due to the fact that illegally
downloading allows for the physical ownership of the respective song, what is assumed to be
of greater value than ’low-quality-streaming’ with a low streaming rate and further quality
constraints. In contrast, the intrinsic value provided by the flat-rate business is assumed to be
higher because its additional features like mobile application or its linkage to social network
sites.31 Furthermore one can argue that music consumers do not have costs in order to search
and eventually find a P2P-platform which offers the songs they like to download. Note that
illegal downloads are associated with a certain level of risk for the music consumer due to
enforcement of copyright law.32 To measure this risk the parameter α will be introduced which
could be understand as a direct cost due to the expected punishment in case of being sued
by the music industry.33 Following Assumption 1 of our model without piracy the following
restriction, namely vB > vP > vA, is imposed. Again, the streaming service sets the advertising
charge and the flat-rate price in order to maximize revenues from the free-of-charge and the flat-
30 Suppose that a flat-rate streaming account is preferred by those music consumers who listen to a lot of music
and who tend to file-sharing compared to the essential more expensive alternative of buying mp3-files (Note
that the digital music store iTunes prices a song between 69 cents and $ 1.29).
31 In terms of quality one can also invoke that the compression of mp3-files reduces sonic quality compared to
high quality streaming music. Additionally, streaming providers allow their customers for creating tracklists
which can be listened in offline mode constituting equivalence between the physical ownership and the stream.
32 Since the successful suit of the music industry against Napster, the industry continued to sue individual
users instead of taking legal action against P2P file-sharing platforms with the intension to discourage illegal
downloads by threaten drastic punishment (See e.g. Bhattacharjee et al. (2006)).
33 A similar parameter which measures the costs of illegal file-sharing was introduced by Ducheˆne and Waelbroeck
(2006).
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rate business. And again, the net valuation of a potential user according to her or his addiction
to music can be measured by her or his utility which can now be written as
Uθ =


θvA − δa free-of-charge subscription
θvP − α piracy
θvB − p
b flat-rate subscription
0 otherwise.
(39)
The potential user characterized by θP is exactly the lowest type of user who will engage in P2P-
file-sharing, while all potential users to the right of θ̂ again subscribe to the flat-rate business.
All respective indifferent potential users can be determined as it was done in the previous model
without piracy by equating utility functions. Thus, one obtains
θP = Max
{
α− δa
vP − vA
,
α
vP
, 0
}
(40)
and
θ̂ = Max
{
pb − δa
vB − vA
,
pb − α
vB − vP
,
pb
vB
, 0
}
. (41)
Note that the potential user who is indifferent between the free-of-charge business and not
subscribing at all remains unchanged. In this section, only the benchmark case in which piracy
occurs and in which the monopolist launches a free-of-charge as well as a flat-rate business should
be considered. In order to derive the demand functions, Figure 5 illustrates the respective
intervals which determine the segmental allocation of potential users under consideration of
piracy.
0 1
θ
free-of-charge
subscribers
flat-rate
subscribers
θ      ̲̂     θ θP
illegal 
downloaders
Figure 4: Segmentation of potential users under piracy with respect to θ.
The respective demand of potential users who decide either to subscribe to the free-of-charge
business or to the flat-rate business can therefore be computed as
DA(a, α) = (θ
P
− θ) =
(δavP − αvA)
vA(vA − vP )
(42)
26
and
DB(p
b, α) = (1− θ̂) =
(vB − vP + α− p
b)
vB − vP
. (43)
Finally, the share of potential users who illegally download is
P (pb, a, α) = (θ̂ − θP ) =
(
pb − α
vB − vP
−
α− δa
vP − vA
)
. (44)
The demand for advertising space of the advertisers is now depending on DA(a, α) and we still
assume advertisers to enter the free-of-charge business until their profits vanish. The level of
commercials which will be provided by advertisers can thus be written as
a˜(r, α) =
σα+ vA(r(vA − vP ))
δσvP
. (45)
Of course one can observe a positive impact of an increase in α on a˜(r, α) due to an increasing
demand for the free-of-charge business caused by an increasing expected penalty through legal
action. Thus, under consideration of piracy, the monopolist faces the following profit function
piM (pb, r, α) =
(
vA(r(vA − vP ) + ασ)
vP δσ
)
r +
(
(vB − vP + α− p
b)
vB − vP
)
pb. (46)
It is assumed that the streaming service maximizes its profits under an exogenously given degree
of copyright enforcement. Again, the maximization problem is reduced to the two first-order
conditions ∂piM/∂r = 0 and ∂piM/∂pb = 0. FOC can thus be written as
r∗(α) =
ασ
2(vP − vA)
(47)
and
pb∗(α) =
vB − vP + α
2
. (48)
In contrast to the previous model without piracy, the equilibrium advertising charge and flat-
rate price are no longer linearly interdependent, but both increase due to an increase in α in
equilibrium. Inserting (47) in (45) yields the equilibrium level of commercials
a∗(r∗, α) =
vAα
2vP δ
. (49)
Using this equilibrium level of commercials allows for the determination of the position of the
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subscriber who is indifferent between a free-of-charge subscription and no subscription at all
θ∗(r∗, α) =
α
2vP
. (50)
By means of r∗(α) and pb∗(α), one can derive the position of those subscribers θP ∗(r∗, α) and
θ̂∗(pb∗, α), who will be the lowest type of user of the P2P-file-sharing-platforms and of the
flat-rate business. One obtains
θP∗(r∗, α) =
α(2vP − vA)
2vP (vP − vA)
(51)
and
θ̂∗(pb∗, α) =
vB − vP − α
2(vB − vP )
. (52)
It is straightforward that the upper bound of the segmental allocation which determines the
number of illegal file-sharers θ̂∗(pb∗, α) depends negatively on α, while the lower bound θP∗(r∗, α)
depends positively on α in equilibrium. Equating (51) and (52) and solving for α yields the
maximal necessary effort of legal action in order to strengthen the expected punishment due to
copyright enforcement in a way that induces all potential users who have illegally downloaded
music to become subscribers to the streaming service in equilibrium.34 This level is given by
αmax(pb∗, r∗) =
vP (vB − vP )(vP − vA)
vP (2vB − vP )− vAvB
. (53)
Furthermore, it can be shown that θP∗(r∗, α) always exceeds θ∗(r∗, α) for values of α > 0,
meaning that the monopolist always launches an ad-funded business as long as there is a threat
of being sued due to illegal file-sharing. Thus, one can determine the equilibrium range of the
level of the legal threats parameter which is given by
0 < α ≤
vP (vB − vP )(vP − vA)
vP (2vB − vP )− vAvB
.
34 We determine αmax as the upper threshold for the legal threats parameter, because a further increase would
lead to economic unintuitive results.
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Proposition 5. Under piracy and the presence of a profit maximizing monopolist, all potential
users suffer losses from an increase in legal threats, while overall welfare will be maximized at
αmax. The level of α can therefore be understand as a rent allocation mechanism between the
monopolist and potential users.
Proof. The short-term aggregated surplus of all potential users in equilibrium can again be
written as the summation of the net valuations of all the subscribers to the free-of-charge and
the flat-rate business as well as of those music listeners who illegally download music. Thus,
aggregated equilibrium ’music consumer surplus’ is
CSP∗(α) =
∫ α(2vP−vA)
2vP (vP−vA)
α
2vP
(
θvA − δ
(
vAα
2vP δ
))
dθ
+
∫ vB−vP−α
2(vB−vP )
α(2vP−vA)
2vP (vP−vA)
(θvP − α)dθ +
∫ 1
vB−vP−α
2(vB−vP )
(
θvB −
vB − vP + α
2
)
dθ.
(54)
By taking the argument of the maximum as well as the argument of the minimum of CSP∗(α)
with respect to α within the legal threats interval [0, αmax], one can show that CSP∗(α) is a
decreasing function in the strength of legal threats. By considering the restrictions 0 < vA <
vP < vB as well as δ > 0 one derives
argmaxα∈[0,αmax]CS
P∗(α) = 0
and
argminα∈[0,αmax]CS
P∗(α) =
vP (vB − vP )(vP − vA)
vP (2vB − vP )− vAvB
= αmax.
Thus, aggregated equilibrium music consumer surplus will be maximal at α = 0 and its minimum
can be found at αmax, within the interval of legal threats. An increase in legal threats in
equilibrium induces more potential users not to listen to streaming music at all. A social planner
who is acting in music consumers’ interest, would therefore reduce prosecution for illegal file-
sharing to allow as many music consumers as possible for listening to music regardless of whether
this will be done by subscribing to the streaming service or by illegally downloading. The overall
short-term equilibrium welfare function under piracy is given by the summation of the aggregated
equilibrium surplus of music consumers and the equilibrium profit of the streaming service and
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can therefore be written as
WP∗(α) = CSP∗(α) +
(
αvA
2δvP
)(
ασ
2(vP − vA)
)
+
(
1−
vB − vP − α
2(vB − vP )
)(
vB − vP + α
2
)
.
(55)
Note that under piracy σ may not urgently exceed δ in order to induce the streaming service
to launch a free-of-charge business. The equilibrium revenue of the streaming service from
launching a free-of-charge business is strictly positive and independent on the relation between
σ and δ. Again, we search for the argument of the maximum of WP∗(α) with respect to α in
the interval [0, αmax] under the familiar constraints and we find that
argmaxα∈[0,αmax]W
P∗(α) =
vP (vB − vP )(vP − vA)
vP (2vB − vP )− vAvB
= αmax.
One can show that WP∗(α) is a convex function in α within the interval [0, αmax]. Note that
WP∗(α) slightly starts to decrease if one increases α in equilibrium starting from α = 0. But
the higher α will be in equilibrium, the stronger will be the increase of the equilibrium profit
of the streaming service. The positive effect of the increasing marginal profit of the monopolist
completely offsets the negative effect of the marginal loss in the number of music listeners
(and thus the negative effect of the marginal loss in aggregated equilibrium surplus of music
consumers). Hence, overall short-term welfare in equilibrium is always maximal at the upper
threshold of the interval for legal threats. 
Furthermore, WP∗(αmax) increases with an increasing difference between the social benefit and
the social cost of a marginal increase in α in equilibrium. To show this, one has to set up
the equilibrium demand functions for the free-of-charge and the flat-rate business under piracy
which can be written as
D∗A(r
∗, α) = (θP∗(r∗, α)− θ∗(r∗, α)) =
α
2(vP − vA)
(56)
and
D∗B(p
b∗, α) = (1− θ̂∗(pb∗, α)) =
(vB − vP + α)
2(vB − vP )
. (57)
Let us first have closer look at the effect of a marginal increase of α in equilibrium on the ad-
funded business which consists of two contrary impacts. At first, a more rigorous prosecution
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of illegal file-sharing induces potential users who previously have been illegal file-sharers to
turn into free-of-charge subscribers. One can observe an increase in θP∗(r∗, α) and therefore
an increase in the demand for the free-of-charge business. This incremental demand causes an
increase in the number of commercials on the free-of-charge business,35 which is accountable for
a loss of subscribers who decide to quit the free-of-charge business and not to subscribe at all.
Therefore we have that ∂θ∗(r∗, α)/∂α > 0. But this effect will be outweighed by the first one
and taken together, one can observe that ∂D∗A(r
∗, α)/∂α > 0. The social cost of a marginal
increase in α consists of the nuisance from the increased level of commercials for the increased
number of free-of-charge subscribers and of the flat-rate price, which has to be payed by those
potential users who will be induced to sign a flat contract.
The social cost of a marginal increase of α is therefore given by
MSC(α) = δ
(
∂DA
∂α
dα
)(
∂a
∂α
dα
)
+
(
∂DB
∂α
dα
)
pb.
In contrast, the marginal social benefit is the increase in the profit of the monopolist due to a
marginal increase in α and is thus given by
MSB(α) = σ
(
∂DA
∂α
dα
)(
∂a
∂α
dα
)
+
(
∂DB
∂α
dα
)
pb.
Consider the demand for the flat-rate business. An increase in α induces former illegal file-
sharers to become subscribers to the flat-rate business and the loss they have to bear, namely
the flat fee pb, which is again supposed to remain constant, is identical to the additional benefit
for the streaming service. It follows that a marginal increase of α is neutral in terms of welfare
with respect to the flat-rate business. Note that the marginal social cost and the marginal
social benefit strictly increase when α increases in equilibrium and it is easy to see that as long
as the willingness to pay of an advertiser to reach one free-of-charge subscriber exceeds the
nuisance cost parameter in equilibrium, the social benefit of a marginal increase in α exceeds
the social cost. The social benefit of a marginal increase in α will completely be captured by
the monopolist. Thus, the higher the margin between the social benefit and the social cost of a
marginal increase in α is, the higher will be the increase in the profit of the monopolist compared
to the decrease in the aggregated equilibrium surplus of music consumers due to this marginal
35 We have ∂a∗(α)/∂α > 0, although this causes an increasing equilibrium advertising charge.
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increase in α. Hence, an increasing margin between σ and δ let maxα∈[0,αmax]W
P∗(α) increase.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the performance of a monopolistic provider of streaming music which
offers a free-of-charge advertising funded business on the one hand and a flat-rate business on
the other hand to its subscribers, who strategically decide whether to subscribe to one of these
businesses or to refuse to streaming music at all. The model was extended by illegal file-sharing,
meaning that music consumers may be able to illegally download and to possess digitalized music
files if they are willing to face the costs of being sued. The investigation focused on an analysis of
the equilibrium with respect to the nuisance created by commercials. By doing so, threshold val-
ues with respect to the aversion to advertising for which either imposing an ad-funded business
or a flat-rate business is not gainful anymore for a monopolistic streaming service were deter-
mined. A monopolistic streaming provider only launches an advertising funded free-of-charge
business if it can fully internalize all revenues which are generated from advertisers. Advertising
funding can be highly profitable if nuisance caused by commercial breaks is relatively weak.
When a low aversion to advertising can be observed, a monopolistic provider would increase
its flat-rate price in order to induce more paying subscribers to turn to free-of-charge users
which leads to losses in the welfare of subscribers. An potential extension of the model could
be an additional charge for users of the ad-funded business when advertising imposes a weak
nuisance as well as a non-negative amount of commercials for the flat-rate business. The model
also neglects competition between streaming services. An interesting investigation would be the
analysis of the effect on the equilibrium charging strategy of two firms which are allowed for
ex-ante differentiation with respect to the quality of their provided businesses.36
Beyond this, the analysis shows that if music consumers posses the alternative of illegally down-
loading music by using P2P file-sharing platforms, the streaming service always launches a
free-of-charge business in equilibrium as long as there is a risk of being sued by the music indus-
try. In equilibrium, aggregated surplus of music consumers is reduced due to an increase in the
enforcement of the copyright law. Thus, strengthening of legal threats allows a social planner
for allocating rents from music consumers to the monopolistic provider.
36 I am very thankful to Yaron Yehezkel who addressed this question.
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An interesting question would be: how and to what extent music labels and their affiliated
artists benefit or suffer from streaming businesses in the long run. As it was mentioned in the
introduction of this paper, a major point of criticism concerning streaming businesses are insuf-
ficient royalty payments for musicians compared to suppliers which sell digitized music files like
iTunes. If this criticism comes true, it would be interesting to investigate whether such stream-
ing business models were deteriorating long term welfare due to impaired revenues for artists
which may be of a restrictive effect on the variety of published music. An approach concerning
long term welfare losses due to a decrease in production is provided by Novos and Waldman
(1984) who show in the case of illegal copying of a nonexcludable good that due to an increase
in copyright protection, social welfare loss, caused by underproduction, decreases.
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A Appendix
Proof of Assumption 3.
To derive the optimal strategy of the monopolistic streaming provider with respect to its two
revenue sources in equilibrium second order conditions must hold. The corresponding Hessian
matrix of the streaming service’s profit function is given by
H(piM ) =

 − 2vB vAδvB − vAσvB
vA
δvB
−
vA
σvB
2vA(vA−vB)
vBδσ

 .
To fulfill the second-order conditions the Hessian must be negative semi-definite for all (r, pb).
This is fulfilled if the first leading principal minor will be negative and the determinant will
be positive. The first principal minor − 2
vB
is always negative and the determinant is given by
detH = 4vA
δσvB
−
v2A
v2
B
(
1
δ2
+ 1
σ2
+ 2
δσ
)
. The determinant is positive if
4δσvB > vA(σ + δ)
2
is fulfilled. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
For values of δ ≤ δ̂, the streaming service maximizes its profit by solely launching an advertising
funded business. The respective demand is therefore reduced to
DA(δ ≤ δ̂) =
(
1−
δa
vA
)
.
The endogenously determined level of advertising space can thus be computed as
a˜(δ ≤ δ̂) =
vA(σ − r)
δσ
.
Without imposing a flat-rate business, the profit function of the streaming service is now reduced
to piM (δ ≤ δ̂) = a˜(δ ≤ δ̂)r. Maximizing with respect to r yields
r∗(δ ≤ δ̂) =
σ
2
.
34
Note that the streaming service asks for an equilibrium charge r∗(δ ≤ δ̂) which is now indepen-
dent on δ. The equilibrium level of advertising can now be computed as
a∗(δ ≤ δ̂) =
vA
2δ
yielding a constant equilibrium free-of-charge demand of
D∗A(a˜
∗(δ ≤ δ̂)) =
1
2
.
Finally, equilibrium profits of the streaming service which are reduced to revenues from the
free-of-charge business, are given by
piM∗(δ ≤ δ̂) = R∗A(δ ≤ δ̂) =
σvA
4δ
.
For δ ≥ δmax advertising becomes of such a nuisance that it is not profitable for the monopolistic
streaming service to launch an advertising funded business. The demand for the flat-rate business
is thus given by
Db(δ ≥ δ
max) =
(
1−
pb
vB
)
.
The profit of the streaming service is now reduced to piM (δ ≥ δmax) = Db(δ ≥ δ
max)pb. Maxi-
mizing with respect to pb let us derive the equilibrium flat-rate price which is given by
pb∗(δ ≥ δmax) =
vB
2
.
Note that we have pb∗(δ). The associated demand is now independent on parameters determining
the level of commercials and thus on a constant level which given by
D∗b (p
b∗(δ ≥ δmax)) =
1
2
.
Hence, equilibrium profits of the streaming service can be written as
piM∗(δ ≥ δmax) = R∗B(δ ≥ δ
max) =
vB
4
.

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